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STEVEN FARRAM
Revolution, Religion and Magic
The PKI in West Timor, 1924-1966
Introduction
The Indonesian Communist Party began as a socialist organization in Java in
1914 and after various permutations took on the name Partai Komunis
Indonesia (PKI) in 1924. Outside the Russian sphere, it was the first commu-
nist party in Asia. Most studies of the PKI stress its activities in Java, and to
a lesser extent Bali and Sumatra, while the other islands have been largely
ignored.1 An examination of the history of the PKI in the Timor region, how-
ever, reveals that the party was adept at adapting to local conditions. The
area is predominantly Christian, but traditional animism and belief in the
powers of the supernatural have remained strong also. The PKI in West
Timor showed from its earliest days up until the point when the party was
dissolved that it was capable of mixing radical politics, Christianity, tradi-
tional magic, and witchcraft into a blend that was palatable to the variety of
local tastes.2 The PKI was no latecomer to the region either, for in the very
year the party was formed, Dutch officials in Timor reported communist
activity in their area. Throughout the Dutch period there was regular men-
tion of communists undermining rust en orde (peace and order) in West Timor
and the surrounding islands. Under the Indonesian administration the PKI
blossomed in West Timor. By the mid-1960s there were PKI members in the
} The major exception is Webb 1986. For detailed information about the history of the PKI
otherwise, see McVey 1968. The rise and fall of the PKI is covered also in a number of general
histories of Indonesia, such as Ricklefs 1990 and Legge 1977.
2
 The mixture of politics with mainstream religions and/or traditional beliefs is not unique
to Timor. Popular protest movements which have combined these elements have been rioted
elsewhere in Indonesia, the Philippines, parts of Europe, and elsewhere. Because of precon-
ceived ideas of what constitutes a 'political movement', these movements have often been
ignored or misunderstood. They deserve far greater attention. For more information, see
Kartodirdjo 1978; Ileto 1989; and Hobsbawm 1965.
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local parliament, in high positions in government departments, and in the
army. They were even active in the Church. The PKI in West Timor was at its
zenith, but on 17 January 1966 ten thousand people reportedly gathered in
Kupang, the major city in West Timor, to demand that it be disbanded.
Apparently it had already 'voluntarily' dissolved itself six days earlier (El
Tari 1972:287). Thus the PKI officially ceased to exist in West Timor, and after
the party was banned in mid-1966, the three letters PKI were rarely heard
there in public again.
The ban, which is still in effect today, came in the aftermath of the so-
called communist coup attempt in Jakarta of 30 September -1 October 1965,
whereby six of Indonesia's top army generals were killed. The role of the PKI
in those events is still being debated. It has been suggested that the 'coup'
was engineered by General Soeharto, who took over as president from
Soekarno soon afterwards, and that it had little to do with the PKI at all. The
CIA has been implicated also.3 The real truth may ultimately prove impossi-
ble to find, but it is not denied that following the 'coup' hundreds of thou-
sands of PKI members, supporters and suspected sympathizers were slaugh-
tered across the archipelago, including Timor.4 In the meantime, the PKI was
demonized by the Soeharto regime, and it was common practice for its
opponents to be branded 'communists'. Only>since Soeharto's downfall have
many Indonesians been willing to talk about the PKI, though for many oth-
ers it remains a taboo subject.5
Early communist activity in West Timor: Christian Pandy and the Sarekat Rajat
History is written by the victor, and the achievements of the members and
associates of the PKI were systematically erased from the official histories by
the Soeharto regime. This included not only those who were implicated in
the 1965 'coup', but many PKI figures who had been active in the Indonesian
independence movement at a much earlier stage.6 Considering this, it is curi-
ous that Christian Pandy, a PKI member and activist in Kupang in the 1920s,
3
 For a discussion of some of the competing theories, see McDonald 1981:43-7. Legge
1977:165 gives a good sample of literature relating to the 'coup'. For US involvement, see Scott
1985.
4
 There are no precise figures for the number of people killed, but there is a consensus that
500,000-1,000,000 is not an unlikely figure, while it might even be much higher. For a list of var-
ious estimates, see Cribb 1990:12.
5
 For this reason the names of some of my informants have been withheld.
6
 Thus names and photographs of people like Air Force Commander Omar Dani were
removed from the military history books, and communist nationalists such as Tan Malaka were
never acknowledged by the Soeharto regime. See 'Pembelaan Sekaligus Penyesalan Omar Dani',
Kompas, 1 February 2001; and 'Peranan Tan Malaka Perlu Diluruskan', Kompas, 13 March 2000.
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in nearly all Indonesian histories of the Timor region is recognized for his
contribution as a nationalist and at the same time acknowledged as a com-
munist.7 There is even a cross erected in his memory in the official Taman
Makam Pahlawan (Heroes' Cemetery) in Kupang.8 Pandy must be one of the
few acknowledged communists to have been so honoured in Indonesia.
Most information concerning Pandy and his contemporaries comes from
reports written by Dutch officials, who clearly viewed 'left-oriented' activists
with disdain. These reports also reveal that the officials considered tradition-
al animist religion and belief in supernatural powers to be inferior to their
own Christian beliefs. Where political activity could be linked to traditional
beliefs, it is often presented in such a way in the Dutch reports as to make it
obvious that the officials felt that neither deserved to be taken seriously.
Nevertheless, as long as the possible prejudices of their writers are kept in
mind, these reports constitute an invaluable and under-utilized source of
information.
Christian Pandy is mentioned in a 1924 report by the Resident C. Schultz
(see Schultz 1925), where it is noted that there had been little political activi-
ty in the Residency of Timor and Dependencies before that year, but that this
had changed with the arrival of a number of activists from outside the area.
One of these was Pandy. Schultz noted that Pandy was originally from the
nearby island of Rote, but had come from Makassar, where he worked as a
'prokrol bamboe' (para-professional lawyer).9 He had also been to Batavia
(Jakarta) and had joined the PKI while in Java. He came to Kupang with
another Rotenese, J.W. Toepoe, and together they established an organization
called Kerapatan Timor Evolutie (Gathering of Timor's Evolution), through
which they aimed to 'look after the interests of their brothers in the Timor
archipelago'. The organization failed, in Schultz's view, because as soon as
Pandy was pointed out as a communist, people were afraid to be associated
with him.
Pandy and Toepoe parted company, whereupon Pandy set up the Sarekat
Timor (Timor League). He claimed that the new organization was to be based
on socialist principles and would aim at 'a free man and a free state'. His
speech at the following meeting of the new organization is described in
Schultz's report as being 'highly communist-tinged'. It was estimated that
Pandy had attracted about forty members, 'chiefly malcontents and undesir-
able elements', according to Schultz.
At the end of 1925 Schultz reported that Pandy had changed the name of
7
 For example, Sejarah 1979:45; Doko 1975:66; Widiyatmika, Sukendro, and Suroto 1978:58.
8
 As I verified on a personal visit in October 2000.
9
 Prokrol bamboe appear to have been unpopular with Dutch officials. Although without for-
mal legal training, they were, and are, often very effective. For more information, see Lev 1973.
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his organization to Sarekat Rajat (People's League) and that membership had
swelled to 1200. He was publishing a newspaper, Api (Fire), which carried
articles complaining about the behaviour of various local rajas. Schultz
reported that Pandy's complaints about Raja Molo's/abominable behaviour
[...] with women' were 'old and true'; but that nothing was to be done about
it. The complaints about the 'misbehaviour' of Raja Amarasi, Alexander
Koroh, were also said to be justified; it was apparently so bad (the details are
not revealed in the reports) that it was concluded that he should be removed,
but that this should be postponed for some time in order that the Raja's
removal and Pandy's campaign against him would not be linked in people's
minds.. This was, in fact, done, but Schultz admitted that Pandy's ability to
take bold action against the government and the rajas, apparently with
impunity, had already impressed the people.10
Pandy built up interest in his organization by promising the abolition of
taxes and corvee labour. In April 1925 he publicly incited the people of
Kampong Solor,. a Muslim area of Kupang, to refuse to do corvee labour.
Twelve people responded to his call and as a result Pandy was convicted and
sentenced to two days' detention. Soon after that, Pandy and some followers
went to nearby Semau Island and held a number of public meetings, 'where
he proclaimed his communist ideas' and incited the people to refuse to per-
form corvee labour or pay taxes. Pandy must have been an effective speaker;
he was said to enthral his. audience. At any rate, he was able to enlist 500 hew
members for the Sarekat Rajat during his visit to Semau (Schultz 1926 and
1927). . . .
Returning to Kupang, Pandy revisited Kampong Solor and again incited
the people to-refuse to.do corvee labour, and this time was given a three-
month sentence. Pandy!s message had already got through, however, and no
fewer than seventy-three people refused to do corvee labour on Semau dur-
ing the month of July while he was in detention. They were punished with
three days' detention. One month later the same people were sentenced to
three months! detention as repeat offenders. Shortly after that another forty
unwilling workers from Funai were given the same punishment. While
Pandy was in detention, the leadership was taken over by Mathias MaE, Tae
Amtiran, arid Selkioma, who did their best to fan the flames of resistance.
Despite the gaolings, morale appears to have been high and all concerned
were looking forward to 24 August, the day the term of Pandy's imprison-
10
 Schultz 1926; C. Schultz, Letter to the Governor-General, 'No. 243/Geheim. Onderwerp:
Klachten tegen den Radja van Molo', 9 December 1925; and Hillen, Letter to the Governor-
General, 'No. Bg.x5/l/7. Zeer Geheim. Onderwerp: Ontheffing van den Zelfbestuurder van
Amarassi, Alexander Koroh, van zyn waardigheid wegens wangedrag', 15 July 1925; both in
Politieke Verslagen.
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ment expired. In the meantime, however, the authorities had been collecting
evidence in relation to the previous meetings held on Semau, and instead of
Pandy coming out of gaol, MaE went in. The final result was that Pandy was
sentenced to a further three years' imprisonment for sedition, and MaE to two
years. A certain Liskodat was convicted also. These convictions appear to
have been the death blow for Pandy's movement, and the day after his sen-
tencing, 120 corvee labourers on Semau who only the day before had refused
to work, obediently reported to carry out their duties (Schultz 1926 and 1927).
After Pandy and MaE were sent to serve their sentences in Cipinang
Prison in Batavia, little more was heard of the Sarekat Rajat in Timor. Sarekat
Rajat had, however, attracted some interest from the island of Adonara, and
some of Raja Lamahala's retinue became members during his visit to Kupang
in July 1925. Not long afterwards a communist soldier, Soeradi, was sta-
tioned on the island and held secret meetings, whereby the organization's
membership increased to 140. Soeradi left Adonara in November and was
dismissed from the army shortly afterwards because of his communist incli-
nations. The Lamahala branch of the Sarekat Rajat managed to hang on, how-
ever, and even had members on other nearby islands. All the rajas of the
Timor area were strongly opposed to the Sarekat Rajat, but Raja Lamahala's
son had attended Soeradi's meetings and the Raja himself, Ismael Adie, had
registered as a member under the fictitious name of Joesoef bin Daoed. When
this was discovered, 'naturally, he was immediately removed from his func-
tion', wrote Resident Schultz (Schultz 1926 and 1927).
' The Adonara branch of the Sarekat Rajat lasted until 1927, but in that year
its putative leader, Achmad Chatib gelar Hadji Datoek Batoeah, an Acehnese
exiled in Kalabahi on nearby Alor, was removed to .the notorious internment
camp of Boven Digul in Dutch New Guinea. The main reason given for this
was his 'communist leanings'. A fellow Acehnese exile, Natar Zainoedin, also
a communist, had been interned at Kefamenanu in Central Timor, but in 1927
was sent with Batoeah to Boven Digul, as a house search revealed that he had
been carrying out 'secret propaganda for his dogma' (Schultz 1927).
Batoeah, Zainoedin, Soeradi, and others, may have been genuine com-
munists, but Resident Schultz commented that many of the people 'associat-
ed with Sarekat Rajat called themselves communist without there being any
sign of communism or understanding of the term' (Schultz 1927). Some of
those associated with Sarekat Rajat were not even aware that they had joined
the organization, as was revealed in the case of Marcus Amtiran, who began
a new action in the Amarasi region in south-western Timor in January 1926.
Amtiran and some helpers began by spreading rumours about a disease
that would devastate Amarasi and about a communist warship which would
land on the coast, whose soldiers would massacre the people. Amtiran then
told the people that they could safeguard themselves against these calamities
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by buying a card from him at the price of / 0.55, which he would show them
how to use as a talisman. The matter was handled with great secrecy, and
those who wanted to participate in the scheme had to use a secret password.
The cards they were sold were membership cards of the Sarekat Rajat.
The matter did not remain secret for long. By late January most of the
cards had been handed in to the government authorities and Marcus
Amtiran was held for questioning. About 400 cards had been sold, but those
who had bought them reportedly had not had the faintest notion that they
were joining an organization and had regarded the cards purely as amulets
to avert the coming disasters. Amtiran was sentenced to two and a half years
gaol for fraud.11
The later activities of Christian Pandy
When Pandy returned to Kupang in 1928 he declared that he would eschew
political movements. He found an alternative outlet in religion and was reg-
istered in the early 1930s as chairman of a new organization, the Bentara
Masehi (Christian Herald). Its stated aims were to teach people the Christian
religion and attempt its application in daily life. Pandy was also editor of the
organization's newspaper, Sedar (Aware).12 In 1934 Pandy and about fifty
supporters split from the Protestant Church and set up their own church.13
Pandy enlisted new members wherever he could, which led to much conflict.
Popular feeling against him grew so strong that many of his followers left
him and he abandoned this sect that had separated from the established
Church. Pandy remained restless, however, and he again started organizing
religious meetings and building up a following with a new group called
Masehi Timor (Timor Christians). The subjects of the group's meetings did
not seem to stray onto political terrain, but Pandy's communist past made
him highly suspect and he was kept under close scrutiny.14
11
 C. Schultz, 'Politiek overzicht over het eerste halfjaar 1926 van de Residentie Timor en
Onderhoorigheden', in Politieke Verslagen. Politics and magic often seem to have been combined
in Indonesia. The membership cards for the Sarekat Islam, established in Java in 1911, were
sometimes also used as amulets. See Ricklefs 1990:158.
12
 Gewestelijk Secretaris Schumacher, 'Politiek overzicht over het jaar 1928 van de Residentie
Timor en Onderhoorigheden'; 'Te Koepang verschijnende periodieken'; and 'Opgave van de
vereenigingen te Koepang'; all in Politieke Verslagen.
13
 The main Protestant Church in Timor at the time was the state-sponsored Indische Kerk, or
Indies Church. Only after World War II were Protestants in Timor able to establish their own
independent church: the Gereja Masehi Injili Timor (Timor Evangelical Christian Church,
GMIT).
14
 J.J. Bosch, 'Politiek verslag van Timor en Onderhoorigheden over het jaar 1934', in Politieke
Verslagen; and Bosch 1935.
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After this episode Pandy kept himself out of the spotlight, and his name
is absent from the Resident's reports for the remaining period before World
War II. In November 1946, however, one Ch. Pandy was listed as being vice-
chairman of a new workers' union in Kupang, the Serikat Kaoem Boeroeh
Indonesia (Indonesian Labour Union, SKBI), which was connected with the
most 'progressive' of the new political groups in Timor, the Persatoean
Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Union, PDI). The SKBI was
instrumental in having a representative from the PDI sent to the SOBSI
(Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia: All-Indonesia Central Labour
Organization, a trade union federation with a strong communist representa-
tion) congress in Java the following year. Members of the more conservative
political groups in Kupang were said to have personal grievances against
Pandy of the SKBI. It seems likely that this was the same Pandy who caused
such a stir back in 1925. If so, this was his swan song, as the name Pandy does
not appear in any further reports.15
Another 'prokrol bamboe communist': Frans Djami
Nearly all the communists mentioned in the early West Timor reports were
associated with the Sarekat Rajat. One communist who was not explicitly
linked to Pandy's group was Frans Djami, but it is possible that he was also
a member. There are otherwise many parallels between the careers of Djami
and Pandy and the development of the Sarekat Rajat.
Frans Djami was from Sabu Island, but in 1925 he was employed as a
teacher on Alor. In the same year he was transferred to South Sulawesi for
promoting communism. In October 1926 he was finally dismissed for the
same reason. In 1931 he became active in the nationalist organization,
Timorsch Verbond (Timorese Alliance), on Rote and in 1933 he was associat-
ed with the same organization in Surabaya. The Timorsch Verbond was con-
sidered radical by some members of the government, but was actually fairly
conservative, seeking reforms rather than revolution and being generally co-
operative with the government. At any rate, Djami's 'extreme fanaticism' was
too much for his fellow members and he was expelled (Bosch 1935).
Djami then moved to Sumba and started working as a prokrol bamboe. The
15
 'Politiek verslag van den Resident van Timor en Onderhoorigheden over de eerste helft
van November 1946' [name author not known; apparently written by the Residentie Secretaris
on behalf of C.W. Schuller]; and C.W. Schuller, 'Politiek verslag van den Resident van Timor en
Onderhoorigheden over de maand Augustus 1947'; both in Algemene Secretarie Archief No.
3259, 'Politieke en economische verslagen betreffende de Residentie Timor en Onderhorigheden,
uitgebracht door de Resident in Kupang; 1946 okt-1947 dec', Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague,
hereafter referred to as ARA, Algemene Secretarie No. 3259.
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government suspected that during his stay there, Djami secretly incited the
local Sabunese people to refuse to pay taxes or do corvee labour. He was also
suspected of selling amulets - another example of the curious blend of radi-
cal politics and traditional magic which is such a recurring theme in the
Timor region during the period of this study (Bosch 1935).
In 1934 Djami moved to Kupang and was soon shown to be involved in
maintaining communist connections. This was as a result of uncensored let-
ters being found in the possession of a communist prisoner at Boven Digul.
The letters had come from his brother, Willa Koij, who lived in Kupang, and
were said, to have been written for him by Frans Djami (Bosch 1935).
In early 1935 Frans Djami set up a newspaper, Tjinta Kebenaran (Devotion
to Truth), in Kupang and was soon fined for publishing libellous articles.
Many of his articles were considered insulting to the government and local
rajas and bordering on the seditious. Resident J.J. Bosch kept Djami under
close observation and awaited a chance to take stronger action. This chance
came in late 1937, when Djami was gaoled for three months for press
offences.16 Djami began publishing again in 1938 but soon gave up, appar-
ently because of lack of interest.17
Frans Djami thereupon disappeared from the official reports, but made a
lasting impression during the Japanese occupation, although in strange cir-
cumstances.rAs mentioned, he had been a member of the Timorsch Verbond,
whose greatest rival had been the Perserikatan Timor (Timor Union), led by
Christian Frans. The Perserikatan Timor was regarded as 'loyal' pro-Dutch.
Nevertheless, Christian Frans became an important figure in the Japanese
government service in Timor.r Djami, who was suspicious of Frans, joined
forces with the Otori, a Japanese secret intelligence group, which suspected
that Frans might be a Dutch agent. One night in September 1943 they kid-
napped Frans and took him out in a boat to Kupang Bay, where he was ques-
tioned. Finally, Frans was bayoneted and his body weighted and thrown into
the harbour. The Japanese authorities unsuccessfully searched for Frans for
ten days, until some naval police became suspicious of an Otori boat prepar-
ing to leave for Ambon. On board they found, among others, Frans Djami.
Under torture Djami told the whole story, but his ordeal had been so great
that he only got the story out with his dying breath. Because they became vic-
tims of the Japanese, both Frans Djami, the communist nationalist, and
16
 J.J. Bosch, 'Politiek verslag van Timor en Onderhoorigheden over het jaar 1935', 'Politiek
verslag van de Residentie Timor en Onderhoorigheden over het jaar 1936', and 'Politiek verslag
van de Residentie Timor en Onderhoorigheden over het eerste halfjaar 1937'; and Gewestelijk
Secretaris Verheul, 'Politiek verslag van de Residentie Timor en Onderhoorigheden over het jaar
1937'; all in Politieke Verslagen.
17
 F.J. Nieboer, 'Politiek verslag van de Residentie Timor en Onderhoorigheden over het jaar
1938', in Politieke Verslagen.
Revolution, Religion and Magic 29
Christian Frans, the man he helped to kill, are now remembered as martyrs
to the nationalist cause (Republik 1953:219; Doko 1975:75-7).
Post-World War II communist upsurge: exported from Australia?
Following the dissolution of the Sarekat Rajat, the Dutch authorities in West
Timor were bothered by little further communist activity in the years leading
up to World War II. One of the few mentions of communists in this period
was in a report about a movement organized by the Kuomintang deputy
from Dili, in neighbouring Portuguese Timor, for the purpose of taking action
against communist-inclined Chinese living in the West Timorese town of
Atambua. What the nature of this action was is not revealed, but the tone of
the report suggests that the Dutch Resident was not too concerned about it.
Perhaps he was complacent because the movement, seemed to involve only
Chinese and was flnft'-communist.18 Following the war? however, the Dutch
were apprehensive about increased communist influence and thought that it
might be being imported into Timor from Australia.
During World War II the Dutch had formed a Netherlands Indies govern-
ment-in-exile in Australia. They were shocked when after the war their plans
to re-occupy their colony began to fall apart as the result of a campaign
begun by Australian trade unions. Black bans were placed on Dutch ship-
ping, supplies were left stranded on wharves, and Indonesians in Australia
who identified with the Republic were given all kinds of assistance.19 The
Dutch were incensed by this behaviour and were highly suspicious of the
Australians who formed part of the post-war occupation force in Indonesia.
In April 1946 the-Dutch Cabinet was informed that intensive communist
propaganda from Australia was being carried into parts of Indonesia, includ-
ing Timor. Allegedly members of the Australian army were involved and
brochures and other kinds of printed material were being brought in on
Australian planes. Similar, claims were made in 1947.20
There may have been some truth in these allegations, but the strongest
communist agitation imported into Indonesia from Australia was probably
that brought in by existing PKI members. These people had come to be in
Australia as a result of the Dutch evacuated from Indonesia at the beginning
18
 P.F.J. Kar thaus , 'Politiek overzicht over het eerste halfjaar 1930 van de Residentie Timor en
Onderhoor igheden ' , in Politieke Verslagen.
19
 For a comprehensive account of this episode, see Lockwood 1975.
20
 'Secretaris van de Ministerraad (Sanders) aan alle de leden van de Ministerraad, 10 april
1946', in Van der Wai 1974:84; "Iijdelijk zaakgelast igde te Canberra (De Ranitz) aan minister van
buitenlaridse zaken (Van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout) , 30 juni 1947', in Van der Wai, Drooglever,
and Schouten 1981:544. . •
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of the war bringing 'dangerous' political prisoners, including PKI members
held in Boven Digul, with them. After at first being re-interned in Australia,
these people were released into the general community following a cam-
paign by trade unionists and others. While in Australia, many of the former
prisoners established contact with the Communist Party of Australia (CPA).
They included important figures like Harjono, who presided over the first
SOBSI congress in 1946, and Sardjono, a long-standing PKI chairman
(Lockwood 1975:28,141).
The Indonesians in Australia supported the Allied war effort and co-oper-
ated with the Dutch authorities, but when the news came through that the
Japanese had surrendered and independence had been declared in
Indonesia, many Indonesians no longer wanted to serve the Dutch.
Indonesian seamen went on strike and sought assistance from their
Australian colleagues. As a result a general boycott was declared on Dutch
shipping to Indonesia and an effort was made to stop any assistance being
given to the anti-Republican forces. These measures were strongly support-
ed by the CPA and communist-controlled trade unions, but also by the great
majority of non-communist Australians. The Australian government tried to
remain neutral, but wanted to get rid of the striking seamen and other
Indonesians stranded on Australian shores and chartered a vessel, the
Esperance Bay, to return them to Indonesia. The Dutch authorities and
Mountbatten of South East Asia Command (SEAC) were opposed to giving
these 'revolutionaries' permission to land in Java or Sumatra, but they had
been given a guarantee that they would be allowed to disembark in
Republican territory. The Australian government eventually reached a com-
promise with its Dutch and British critics whereby nineteen of the most
active leaders were put ashore in Timor. They included a number of Boven
Digul men. The rest continued on to Java.21
It had been decided not to hand the Indonesians over to the Dutch author-
ities, so eighteen of them were removed to Semau Island, not far from
Kupang, and provided for by the Australian army, while the nineteenth,
accompanied by his wife and seven children, was kept in a house in Kupang
with 'an Australian guard to protect him from the Dutch and to protect the
Timorese from him'.22 Eventually in March 1946 the group was airlifted out
of Kupang to begin a circuitous journey to Java via North Borneo and
Singapore. By then their number had grown to thirty-two, as some of the
men had acquired wives during their stay on Semau.23
21
 Lockwood 1975:92-3, 138-44; 'Mountbat ten to Chifley, 20 October 1945', in H u d s o n and
May 1989:521-2.
22
 Nat ional Archives of Australia (hereafter referred to as NAA) , M P 7 4 2 / 1 , 1 1 5 / 1 / 2 8 5 .
23
 NAA, MP742/1,115/1/285; NAA, A1838/278, 401/3/6/1/7.
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Whether or not these 'extremely dangerous' 'expert agitators' managed to
pass on any of their revolutionary communist ideas to the local Timorese
population is unknown. In December 1948, however, one Nisi KoEn was
arrested on Semau for inciting the local people to ignore the orders of Raja
Kupang and to refuse to send their children to school or pay taxes. It was
reported that 'Nisi KoEn has been to Australia, and the fact that there is a
communist strain in his propaganda is not surprising'.24
Other post-World War II communist activities in the Timor region
Just three months before the appearance of the report concerning Nisi KoEn
the Resident wrote confidently: 'There does not appear to be any communist
activity in this Residency: although there are some old PKI members in
Kupang, there is no activity on their part that we know of'.25 There were obvi-
ously some communists in Timor, but these would seem to have been very
few.
A.M. Kiah was one person noted as being 'suspected of communist sym-
pathies'. Kiah was the PDI representative sent to the 1947 SOBSI congress
mentioned earlier. In his report on the congress, he spoke of the oppression
of workers in Timor and of the legitimacy of the strike weapon. This kind of
talk was alarming to the Dutch authorities, but they consoled themselves in
the knowledge that most of the PDI leadership were against co-operation
with SOBSI.26 In fact, the PDI leaders were keen to project a moderate image,
and at a public meeting in February 1948 the chairman, Benyamin Sahetapy
Engel, went out of his way to counter assertions that the PDI was a left-ori-
ented organization.27 A 1948 government report on the trade unions of East
Indonesia, which included Timor, noted that there were no obvious socialist
or communist tendencies there (Drooglever and Schouten 1986:384).
The Dutch agreed at the very end of 1949 to leave Indonesia. It seems that
24
 A. Verhoef, 'Politiek vers lag v a n de Resident v a n Timor e n O n d e r h o o r i g h e d e n over he t tijd-
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there was still little communist activity in the Timor, region throughout the
1950s. Nevertheless, when such activity was discovered, the Indonesian
authorities appear to have welcomed it as little as the Dutch had. In 1947 the
latter had uncovered an opposition movement on the island of Adonara.
They had gaoled the members of the Kumpulan Indonesia Merdeka
(Independent Indonesia Association), but the Indonesians released them in
1950. These then formed the Persaudaraan Kaum Tani Indonesia (Brother-
hood of Indonesian Farmers, PKTI) and as such, again using Adonara as a
base, were involved in road-building and health programmes. The group
then staged a revolt, and its leaders were back in gaol in the mid-1950s. At
their trials, these leaders admitted that they were communists and that the
letters PKTI really stood for Partai Komunis Tjabang Indonesia (Communist
Party, Indonesian Branch).28
The issue of the growing influence of communists in the Protestant
Church in Timor was raised at the Church's 1958 General Assembly, but was
not pursued.29 It obviously caused some concern, for in the same year one
Protestant preacher in Kupang had an article published which was strongly
anti-PKI.30 The PKI was just beginning to expand at the time; by the early
1960s its influence in West Timor had reached unprecedented proportions.
The 1960s: the communist explosion
The growth of the PKI's influence on the national scene in the early 1960s had
been helped in no small part by President Soekarno, who had promoted the
concept of Nasakom (Nasionalisme Agama Komunisme, Nationalism
Religion Communism) as a guiding principle of the Indonesian nation. One
of Soekamo's aims in doing so was to create a balance among the competing
forces in Indonesia and to prevent any one of them, including the army, from
gaining the upper hand (Legge 1977:161-2). The worsening economic situa-
tion of the early 1960s also favoured the PKI, as it offered help to poor farm-
ers and campaigned energetically for land reform.
While many Church members in the Timor region looked askance at
Soekamo's flirtation with the PKI, many others saw the Church's protector in
him, as they recognized that he had been instrumental in putting a stop to the
push for Indonesia to become a Muslim state. Some of the region's best-edu-
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cated people - lecturers at the regional university in Kupang and many
schoolteachers - reportedly joined the PKI, while at the same time remaining
members of the Gereja Masehi Injili Timor (Timor Evangelical Christian
Church, GMIT). They were also some of the. most vocarsupporters of
Nasakom, believing that what they were doing was supported by the
President and that this was therefore the appropriate course of action in the
national interest. In addition, many Protestant ministers in rural Timor were
able to relate to PKI demands for land reform and social justice, as there was
great poverty in the countryside and the GMIT itself had a very weak social
welfare programme. • • -' ' '
On the other hand, in the Belu region of West Timor, near the East Timor
border, where the majority religion is Catholicism, the Church is said to have
been less troubled by the PKI (Webb 1986:99-101). This may have been justi-
fied, as far as PKI infiltration of the Church was concerned, but the party
apparently- managed to gain many adherents among the common people,
and it was reported that in 1963 the PKI-affiliated Barisan Tani Indonesia
(Indonesian Farmers' Front, BTI) already had over 16,000 members in the
area (El Tari 1972:263). -
While individual Church members were able to reconcile active involve-
ment in the Church with involvement in the PKI at the same time, the
Protestant Church hierarchy was aware that it was facing a big problem. It
had noted the growing influence of the PKI in 1958, but acknowledged this
as a serious matter at the June 1960 GMIT General Assembly because a num-
ber of ministers and Church elders had joined the party. A letter was then
sent to all the members, warning them against communism and informing
them that if they did not leave the party by 31 December 1960, they would
lose their places on the Church Councils. Eventually one minister was dis-
missed and another was suspended for refusing to renounce communism.?1
The head of the PKI for Timor and the surrounding islands, Thobias (As)
Paulus Rissi, then paid a visit to a senior member of the GMIT Synod. At the
meeting Rissi became agitated and launched into a series of rhetorical ques-
tions: 'Do you know who Soekarno is? Do you know what Nasakom is? Do
you know that all who oppose Nasakom will be "run over"?' He then
demanded that the GMIT should not bother the PKI, then in turn the PKI
would riot bother the GMIT.32 Rissi also vented his anger in a PKI newsletter
widely distributed in Kupang, in which he attacked the Moderator of the
GMIT and various non-communists in the local government. Another of his
targets was the Methodist Reverend G.S. Dicker, who had lived in West
31
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Timor since 1956. In one of his sermons, Dicker had been critical of the PKI,
so he was now labelled as an 'imperialist meddler' who should be expelled.33
While the PKI in Timor was critical of senior Church figures on a person-
al level, it did not discourage Church membership. As far as it was con-
cerned, it was perfectly all right to be a member of the party and of the
Church at the same time.34 Far from trying to turn the people away from the
Church, PKI members reportedly used its popularity to try and lure unso-
phisticated members into the party by telling them that the letters PKI stood
for Partai Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Protestant Party), whereas in fact
this party used the abbreviation Parkindo (Brookes 1977:85).
The PKI became a force to be reckoned with in Timor. In some places PKI
members were threatening to take over the congregation and church organi-
zation, and in a very few places anti-PKI elements had been forced out.35 In
many villages, the PKI and its associated organizations, such as the BTI, were
practically in control, and the means used-to sign.up illiterate farmers were
deceptive, to say the least. People were promised an end of taxation and of
compulsory communal labour, and a motor vehicle for every family (Brookes
1977:84-5). Apart from the modern addition of a vehicle, the promises were
basically the same as those made.by Christian Pandy and Sarekat Rajat back
in 1925. The parallels go even further, because in some places there was also
a campaign against the local raja. Raja Amarasi, Victor Koroh, a nephew of
the raja whom in the 1920s Pandy had been instrumental in having dis-
missed, was a particular target. Ironically, this was partly because he was a
fairly enlightened ruler who tried to modernize his kingdom in areas such as
education and trade. This made him a favourite with the government, which
liked to use his kingdom as a showplace for visitors. Koroh's reforms threat-
ened to breathe new life into the institution of the kingdom, and so the PKI
retaliated with 'anti-feudal' propaganda (Cunningham 1962:26-8).
The real extent of PKI support in Timor is hard to estimate..As already
indicated, many people were lured into joining the party and its associated
organizations by false promises or misrepresentations of the party as a total-
ly different organization (Partai Kristen Indonesia). Paul Webb (1986:100) has
suggested the likelihood that many uneducated peasants joined the PKI sim-
ply because their minister or village teacher told them to. Yet even the min-
isters and teachers - some of the best educated people in the community -
often had only a vague understanding of Marxist ideology and communism.
Under these circumstances the researcher must be wary when faced with
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statements about the extent of PKI membership in Timor, as this does not
necessarily reflect a total commitment to communist ideology as it is gener-
ally understood.36 PKI infiltration of the Church should not be over-estimat-
ed either; it may be, as Webb states, that many of those who were members
of both the PKI and the Church had some belief in the ideas of both institu-
tions, without being deeply committed to either (Webb 1986:100). On the
other hand, there is no reason to believe that the PKI members in Timor were
any less sincere in their Christian beliefs than any other members of the
Church. Many had been brought up in religious families. These included the
PKI head As Rissi, whose own father was a minister.37 Another example was
Francesca Fanggidaej, the granddaughter of a Rotenese bible-translator, who
was an activist in the PKI women's movement (Fox 1977:195). Finally, there
is the testimony of the wife of the head of the Nunhila PKI branch in
Kupang38, who was killed in 1965, that she came from a very religious fami-
ly, that her husband sang in the church choir, and that all the PKI members
she knew were members of the Church. They were all Christians before they
became communists. She did not know where the idea came from that com-
munists did not believe in God.
There were many possible reasons why people joined communist organi-
zations in West Timor in the 1960s. A good example is the case of the Nabuasa
clan of Amanuban in Central Timor outlined by Andrew McWilliam
(1999:135). At the time of the Dutch conquest, the Nabuasas had been strug-
gling to maintain their autonomy vis-a-vis the Nope clan, but when the
Dutch recognized the Nopes as the ruling clan in Amanuban, the Nabuasas
were forced to submit. Some Nabuasa leaders apparently joined the PKI in
the early 1960s in' an attempt to reassert their clan's autonomy vis-a-vis the
Nopes. Some of them may also have joined, however, in reaction to certain
local Christians who were opposed to the traditional animistic practices still
observed and supported by members of the Nabuasa clan. In both cases the
actions of the clan leaders were self-defeating. Following the 1965 'coup'
many senior Nabuasa figures were killed, and the stigma attaching to the
survivors entailed that the chances of political autonomy for the clan were far
36
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lower than before., Meanwhile, the Soeharto regime's insistence that all
Indonesian citizens should belong to one of the recognized major religions
made it even more difficult to defend the preservation of traditional animist
beliefs. The Nabuasa case also highlights another aspect of the PKI in West
Timor in the 1960s, and that is that the party seemed to be all things to all
people. In Amarasi the PKI was anti-feudal, but in Amanuban the Nabuasa
clan looked to the PKI for help in re-establishing its traditional authority. The
leaders of the Nabuasa clan also looked to the PKI for protection of their ani-
mist beliefs in the face of attacks by members of the Church, whilst elsewhere
the PKI encouraged the notion that it was a 'Christian-friendly' organization.
Webb. (1986:105-6) relates how on the predominantly Roman Catholic
island of Flores the PKI managed to gain a foothold among poor farmers by
promising land reforms, while, as in Timor, the people's understanding of the
tenets of communism was virtually nil. He suggests that some of these
people may have joined the PKI simply to bring some adventure and excite-
ment into their otherwise dull and weary lives. Webb also relates the story of
PKI members on the island of Solor, between Flores and Timor, declaring that
after the PKI took over, it would dig out the mountain behind the town,
exposing a waterfall and sacks of rice, which would provide food for all.
After that a ship would arrive bringing more sacks of rice. As Webb points
out, the poverty and uncertainty, on Solor at the time were as great as any-
where else in the region, and' this improvised 'cargo cult' must have brought
some comfort to its adherents. That the PKI members of Solor also claimed to
be good Catholics indicates that neither Christianity nor politics was capable
of providing adequate answers in those troubled times.
A similar 'cargo cult' was started in Timor by Balthasar Klau, and it is this
case which most clearly, links the PKI with traditional magic and witchcraft
in Timor. Simon Schaper was the local Roman Catholic priest in the area
where Klau lived, on the south coast of the Belu region. He knew Klau well
in the 1950s and 1960s and gives a detailed account of the development of his
movement. The.picture Schaper paints is that of an extremely ambitious man
who manipulated traditional beliefs to entice gullible people to join the PKI.
This may be correct, but it is possible that Klau and his followers had no dif-
ficulty in reconciling the indigenous animist religion with the ideology of the
PKI. Klau undertook a number of actions to undermine the authority of the
local rajas, in line with long-standing PKI practice on Timor, but it looks as if
this may have been more out of spite as a result of Klau's failure to achieve
his own ambition to become a raja. That Klau's association with the PKI may
have been little more than opportunistic is suggested also by the fact that he
was previously a member of both the Partai Katolik (Catholic Party) and the
Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party) (Schaper 1974;
1984:38). Of course, Klau may have been in the PKI all along, membership of
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the other parties being part of a long-term strategy. Without more informa-
tion it is impossible to know.
Balthasar Klau was related to Raja Lakekun and claimed that the latter's
position was rightfully his. He failed to win any support for his cause and
then became active in campaigns against the traditional rights of the rajas,
such as the right to a portion of the harvest. These rights were enshrined in
the local adat (custom), which Klau always claimed to support. Klau's record
of attendance at local adat ceremonies was poor, however, and he broke many
local rules. Most of the adat authorities therefore ignored him, but he built up
a following when he started working as a makdok - a traditional healer who
claims' to have access to the spirits of the ancestors. Klau was helped in his
efforts as his house at Aubot was not far from Masin Lulik, the spot where it
was believed the ancestors' spirits dwelled. Two female makdok joined Klau
as his concubines, and he attracted other followers, who retailed amulets and
magic formulas. Klau claimed that by means of a number of ceremonies he
would accomplish a ;great feat and unite the spirit world with the world of
the living. When this was achieved, there would no longer be any need for
the people to work and they would be freed of all the restraints of adat and
religion. The adat elders said that this was impossible, but this only made
Klau seem even more powerful (Schaper 1974; 1984:17,27-30).
One of Klau's great supporters was Willem Asa, a former schoolteacher
who in 1962 became PKI Secretary for South Belu. Klau also had contacts
with Edja, PKI Secretary of Atambua, and the local leader of the BTI, Fanus
Pinai. Schaper views Klau's involvement with the PKI as being aimed at
undermining all authority: that of the adat elders, the church and the gov-
ernment. This would then leave an empty shell for 'atheistic communism'.
Schaper notes that in the area where Klau was active there was a marked
decline in church attendance. In the meantime, however,' Klau pushed on
with his programme. In October 1964 he sacrificed a red buffalo, three red
pigs and a red hen to 'drive away the devil' and prepare the ground for the
final ceremony, which would take place in:1965. In that ceremony two large
canoes, the Ro Kukun (Spirit Boat) and the Ro Roman (People's Boat), would
sail down the river to sea with Klau on board; They would later return
loaded with an abundance of useful goods and luxury articles (Schaper 1974;
1984:29-41). • .
In January 1965 Klau opened a savings bank and loan office, using the
admission fees to pay for the preparations for the great final ceremony. He
also signed up people for three co-operative organizations and had no short-
age of applicants for this. He collected the fees and handed the new members
a PKI membership card. The Roman Catholic bishop of Atambua became
alarmed at the progress of this movement. Finding that neither Klau nor his
communist supporters heeded his advice, he excommunicated them. His
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action seems to have had no effect, and the people gathered at Aubot to
rehearse the final ceremony, singing versions of Nasakom songs while they
waited for the great day. The ceremony was never held, however. When news
broke of the failed 'coup' in Jakarta, Klau disappeared. It later appeared that
he had been executed, like scores of other PKI members from the area
(Schaper 1984:30-2, 63; Webb 1986:102).
The fantastic promises of people like Balthasar Klau were made to.entice
some Timorese to become members of the PKI, while vague promises of
material advantages or land played a role in attracting many of the rural
poor. Specific promises were sometimes made to more sophisticated city peo-
ple. Such was the case with Andreas Yohannes, who in-the mid-1960s was
head of the Department of Social Services in Kupang. Yohannes had a cousin
who was a member of the PKI who, he says, approached him with the prom-
ise to recommend him for the position of Bupati (Regent) if he joined the
party.39 Yohannes rebuffed him and does not know what happened to him,
except that he was taken to Java after 1965 and never returned. While
Yohannes turned down the offer to join the PKI, other senior government fig-
ures in Kupang were alleged to have joined the party, such as the head of the
Information Department.40 The local.army commander, Lieutenant-Colonel
Soetarmadji, and the local head of the government radio station, R. Amir
Tjiptoprawiro, were also said to be PKI members (Gerakan 1996:116).
Because of President Soekarno's propagation of the concept of Nasakom,
the PKI won a degree of respectability. As early as the beginning of 1961, As
Rissi was chosen as one of the three members representing the Timor region
in the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly,
MPR), and by 1965 there were fifteen members associated with the PKI in the
local parliament.41 Other PKI members were in the army and in senior posi-
tions in government, as mentioned, and yet others were working as-teachers
or were associated with the church. The PKI had a number of affiliated
organizations which attracted many members in Timor, including the trade
union organization, SOBSI, the BTI for farmers, the women's group Gerwani,
a students' group, and others. With so many people from all walks of life,
including some very prominent figures, being associated with the PKI, the
party seemed quite respectable. In the rural areas the PKI had attracted inter-
est with its demands for land reform, but also with its offers of immediate
practical help. For instance, when drought and crop failures in 1964 and 1965
resulted in widespread famine in West Timor, with food prices soaring and
many families finding it almost impossible to get enough to eat, in many
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cases it was the PKI which brought relief in the form of food and money.
Many people then joined the party out of gratitude.42 The PKI was of course
not universally loved in Timor; many people were suspicious of it and often
openly hostile to it. Although it had members, for example, in the army and
the church, it had many more opponents in these two institutions. The PKI
had a broad appeal in its aims of promoting social and economic equality.
While this was welcomed by some of Timor's-secular elite and many mem-
bers of the army and church, it was rejected by others, who saw the PKI as a
threat to their positions. To them the PKI was opportunistic, atheistic and
anti-capitalist. Although Soekarno had tried with Nasakom to balance the
forces competing for power in Indonesia, by late 1965 his authority was wan-
ing and he could not keep these forces under control. As a result, many
people on Timor who had allied themselves with the PKI were left in a very
vulnerable position.
30 September 1965: the end of the party
According to the Soeharto regime's version of events the PKI had planned a
nation-wide slaughter of its opponents in the wake of the Jakarta 'coup'. This
was to apply to Timor also, and in mid-September 1965 a PKI official was
sent to Kupang to pass on the relevant instructions of the PKI Politburo. On
27 September As Rissi convened a meeting to establish a revolutionary coun-
cil and to discuss the removal of government officials and religious leaders.
The chairman of the council was to be Army Commander Soetarmadji.
However, when the people learnt what had been happening in Jakarta and
realized that the revolutionary council was being manipulated by the PKI,
their anger could not be contained. They then gathered in Kupang in their
thousands to call for the destruction of the '30 September Movement'. A new
army chief was then appointed to restore peace and quiet (Gerakan 1996:91,
115-6).
One of the more remarkable features of this official version of events is
that Timor is given so much attention. Many other areas are merely men-
tioned in passing or not at all. It may be that PKI activity was more intensive
in Timor than in some of the other regions, but it is impossible to know for
certain due to the dearth of information. For Timor itself there are a few frag-
mentary press accounts of events at the time and one or two mentions in
other sources, but oral accounts are the main source. Though most of these
have to be taken at face value, they can be checked one against the other, as
well as with the small body of documentary evidence.
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A useful document in this regard is the report written by. Brigadier-
General El Tari concerning the.period 1968-72/when he was Governor of the
province of Nusa Tenggara Timur.43 El Tari (1972:32-3) also gives an account
of events that occurred in Timor before he became Governor, when he was
still a serving soldier. The report includes a photograph of General Achmad
Yard with Lieutenant-Colonel Soetarmadji taken in Kupang on 28 September
1965 - just two days before Yani was killed in Jakarta in connection with the
'coup'. The caption states that there were plans for Yani to be killed by the PKI
and that Soetarmadji was involved in the plot. This is a revelation! If Yani had
been killed in Kupang before the 'coup' in Jakarta actually took place, this
would surely have had an enormous influence oh the course of events. El Tari
gives no further details. It is said> however, that during his stay in Kupang,
General Yard was followed around by As Rissi all the time, and later a
rumour circulated that there had been an attempt to kill Yani with a poisoned
apple. Concerning Soetarmadji's involvement, a senior member of the GMIT
Synod of the time recalled that after the news of the 'coup' in Jakarta reached
Kupang, a weeping Soetarmadji called him and other community leaders
into his office, where he offered his apologies for all that had happened.44
This man; did not necessarily regard this as an admission of complicity, but
one wonders what else it could have meant. On the other hand, this does not
look like the behaviour of a man who hadbeen planning to ruthlessly kill all
the people he had invited to his office.
El Tari (1972:260-79) also gives a good picture of the political climate in
Timor around the time of the 'coup'. The PKI had a newspaper, Pelopor
(Pioneer), which he says it used to stir up the people against the government.
The BTI and other PKI organizations across Timor were trying to do the
same. In 1965 the streets of Kupang were covered with PKI posters with
propaganda for Nasakom, proclaiming the need for 'revolutionary leaders'
and land reform. On the other hand, everyone at the time was concerned
with national issues, and a mass meeting in Kupang in April 1964 drew a
crowd of 10,000 who all stated their wish to destroy the 'puppet state' of
Malaysia. In 1965 there was another mass meeting in Kupang to support
Soekamo's attendance at the Asia-Africa Conference, as well as an all-party
conference on Nasakom.'The PKI did not have a monopoly on political activ-
ity in Timor in 1965. > >'
Whether or not the PKI had been planning any action in Timor at the.time
of the 'coup' is a question that remains difficult to answer. There is certainly
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a widespread belief still today that they planned many killings. In the forest
near the Central Timorese town of SoE the communists are supposed to have
dug graves in which to bury, the Bupati and other government officials.
However, in the event it was they themselves who filled the graves. In
Kupang allegedly 'black lists' were found of prominent church leaders and
others who had opposed the PKI who were to have been liquidated. Their
bodies were to have beeri disposed of in an open drain leading to sea. The
communists had also dug graves for their victims in Kupang, but as in SoE,
it turned out that they had dug their own graves.45 And so it goes on. These
simple stories sound apocryphal and self-justifying, but there are also some
more detailed reports of planned PKI action. Dr Maria Patty-Noach recalled
that there, was an air-raid practice in Kupang just before the 'coup'. A num-
ber of Christian leaders and non-communist government officials were gath-
ered together and taken out of town. Nothing happened and eventually, they
all returned home. The next day, however, they learnt of the 'coup' in Jakarta.
Patty-Noach surmises that these people were to have been killed, but that for
some reason the order never came through and they were released.46 John
Hughes (1967:142-3) recorded a similar story of non-communist officials and
their spouses being gathered outside Kupang for a 'special briefing', but
being returned unharmed when the local army units refused to align them-
selves with the communist plotters. The truth about these cases will probably
never be known, but it would seem that most PKI members in Timor were as
surprised to hear about the 'coup' in Jakarta as everybody else. Father
Schaper (1984:61) knew of the events in Jakarta from reports on Radio
Australia, but suspected that the local communist leaders in Belu knew noth-
ing of what had been happening. They coolly carried on with their daily
activities and continued to greet him casually, until they were captured by
the military several days after the 'coup'. The wife of the head of the PKI's
Nunhila branch recalled that her husband and his associates knew nothing
about the 'coup' and were very surprised.47
El Tari (1972:281, 284-7) reports that it took some time for the people of
Timor to respond to the news of the 'coup', but that on 28 October 1965 there
was some 'spontaneous action': the houses of As Rissi and other PKI leaders
were pelted with stones; some PKI members were captured by local youths
(although he does not say what they did with them); and all the signboards
in Kupang with the initials PKI were pulled down. All this is said to have
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occurred 'without incident'. At mass meetings in Kupang on 20 November
1965 and again on 17 January 1966 ten thousand people reportedly declared
their loyalty to Soekarno and 'the revolution', but demanded that the PKI and
all its associated organizations be dissolved. The PKI is alleged to have 'vol-
untarily' disbanded itself already on 11 January 1966. El Tari admits that fur-
ther action was also taken and, without going into detail, says that the PKI
was 'wiped out', 'down to the village level', by the government and army
with the help of the people.
Apparently the army and the police rounded up all known PKI members;
the most prominent ones, such as Rissi and Soetarmadji, were taken away to
Jakarta or Denpasar (most were never seen again, but Rissi is said by sever-
al sources to have returned to Kupang to live in the 1990s). A handful of PKI
activists were formally arrested and gaoled.48 Then the killings began. On
Timor these were organized by the army, but the leaders of political parties
and heads of government departments were ordered to be present, presum-
ably in order to share in the guilt.49 Many did not want to attend. Yohannes,
for instance, recalled how he had delegated one of his staff to go in his place.
When the man returned, the interior of the departmental vehicle was covered
in blood. Asked what had happened, he replied that one PKI member had
tried to escape while being transported to his death, and so he had been shot
and his body loaded into the car. The vehicle was hastily cleaned up.
Yohannes had heard that some of those shot had not yet been dead when
they were buried.50 Many of those killed were schoolteachers and low-level
government officials.51 Some of the latter had no connections with the PKI
apart from the fact that they had worn SOBSI badges or the like on the orders
of their superiors at some time, photographs of which were produced as 'evi-
dence' of their 'guilt'.52
Some GMIT ministers were able to save lives by stepping in to counter
false accusations being made to the army by opportunists trying to settle old
scores.53 There were also some ministers and many teachers from GMIT
48
 Interviews wi th Andreas Yohannes, SoE, 26 June 2000; Maria Pat ty-Noach, Kupang , 30
June 2000; n a m e withheld , Kupang , 7 July and 4 N o v e m b e r 2000; a n d Minggus Ratukore,
Kupang , 7 July 2000.
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schools who were arrested and interrogated as communist sympathizers. At
least one minister, a few other church officials, and a number of teachers were
killed (Cooley 1976:346-7; Brookes 1977:147). Webb (1986:112) was told that
some Chinese who were killed as communist sympathizers in Timor were
simply moneylenders who were removed with a view to clearing outstand-
ing debts. The Chinese were clearly targeted, however, as the Pecinaan
(Chinese quarter) which had existed in Kupang since the nineteenth century
was completely destroyed. Temples and schools were closed, Chinese organ-
izations were disbanded, and many of those who were not killed fled the city,
never to return (Julianus and Harzufri 2001; El Tari 1972:289). There are said
to be a number of mass graves around Kupang and numerous others else-
where in Timor where victims were buried. An Australian businessman who
visited Timor a few years after the killings was shown a spot outside Kupang
by a government official where hundreds of suspected communists were
said to lie buried (Wilson 1992:49). The official admitted that many innocent
people had been killed along with the communists - a point generally agreed
on in Timor today by those who are prepared to discuss the matter. All
sources agree that the number of those who died must run at least in the hun-
dreds, while some put the figure at 2,000 or higher.54
The methods of dealing with PKI members seem to have varied from
place to place. Fifteen PKI members who were adherents of the 'cargo cult' of
Solor Island reportedly were taken to mainland Flores, where they were beat-
en by soldiers, and then handed back to the community for punishment. The
villagers beheaded them and then sought out fifteen other local 'trouble-
makers' and removed their heads also. These extra killings provoked
reprisals by the police, and some of the culprits were imprisoned (Webb
1986:106-7). This seems to have been an exceptional case, however, for it was
reported to have been usual in Timor for entire families of communists to be
executed to reduce the chances of revenge (Sulzberger 1966). Schaper
(1984:54-7, 63) reports that PKI activists from South Belu were interrogated
by a team of three judges and then liquidated by the military. A very few
were acquitted. Many were held for months before their cases were dealt
with, and some went mad in the interim. At least one man committed suicide
on receiving the message that he had to report to the judges. Sometimes the
killings by members of the public were used to deflect blame from the military, as the army is
said to have carried out most of the killings on Timor, including those based on 'information
received'. It is difficult to draw solid conclusions about these matters, however, due to the scant
evidence.
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prisoners were allowed to return home without an escort to collect food, but
they rarely tried to escape, for if they did, one of their fellow prisoners was
decapitated and their families were threatened. Later the military issued a
summons for all remaining PKI members in South Belu to appear in the dis-
trict capital Atambua. The wet season was already far advanced and a long
caravan of people trudged to the town through the rain for a distance of over
sixty kilometres. On arrival in Atambua they were led to the crossroads in the
middle of the town, where on top of a big petrol drum sat the decapitated
head of Balthasar Klau, the PKI makdok of South Belu. The long procession
was guided around the drum and then without further ado allowed to start
the long journey back home.
The South Belu PKI members may have been fortunate, as the killings in
other places seem to have taken place on a much larger scale. In Kupang it
was reportedly difficult for years to have basic repairs such as plumbing
done, as all the tradesmen had been 'communists' killed in 1965 (Wilson
1992:52-3). The wife of the head of the PKI's Nunhila branch reported that her
husband was held for a short while at the old Dutch gaol in Kupang before
being taken to an unknown location to be killed and buried. All the members
of his branch, thirty to forty people, suffered a similar fate. During the first
few days of the killings, she said, an unnatural silence descended on Kupang
and everyone avoided going out of their houses. She was heavily pregnant at
the time and gave birth on 7 October. The very next day she was taken to the
police station and, although interrogated for several days, steadfastly denied
any personal involvement with the PKI. She was kept at the station for a long
time with little food and no shelter. Exposed to the elements, her child
became sickly and died soon after she was released. The release from deten-
tion was not the end of her ordeal, however: like probably thousands of oth-
ers on Timor, she was kept under surveillance. She was sacked from her civil
service job and told she would never be allowed to work for the government
again. When years later she landed a job with a foreign company and was
given an opportunity to travel abroad, she was refused travel documents.55
There were many other cases in which relatives of PKI members were made
to suffer and forced out of their jobs, or barred from getting a job. One of the
best-known cases in Timor was that of the Marcus family. M. Marcus was a
teacher and head of the BTI in SoE. His son Octo was also a teacher and a
communist. Both were killed after the 'coup'. Another of Marcus' children
was a highly respected staff member at the state university in Kupang and a
known anti-communist. Nevertheless, when this Drs J.F. Marcus was
appointed rektor (vice-chancellor) of the university, Jakarta would not ratify
55
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the appointment because of the family's PKI connections.56 Reprisals against
those accused of PKI involvement continued into the 1970s and 1980s, with
many civil servants being dismissed from their positions. The matter is still
an issue today, and in mid-2000 it was reported that six teachers from Central
Timor whowere dismissed in 1983 were trying to have their case reviewed
and to get re-appointed (Ans 2000).
As elsewhere in Indonesia, the killings in Timor were not confined to the
period immediately after the 'coup', but continued throughout 1966 and well
into 1967. The wife of the PKI leader cited above blamed 'fanatical Muslims'
for many of these killings, which she said only stopped after repeated com-
plaints by Parkindo that those being killed were not communists but
Christians.57 Webb (1986:105) reports that the 'fanatical Muslim' complaint
was heard also on Flores and that the Timorese Archbishop of Ende forbade
Catholics to participate in the killings even after being ordered by the local
Javanese army commander to do so. Muslims in Timor had actually been
involved with the PKI since the earliest days, but during the days after the
'coup' all manner of tensions came to the surface. It certainly appears that the
killings were often far from 'spontaneous' and were carried out in accordance
with an agenda set far away from the Timor area. This seems to be especial-
ly true with respect to the army's insistence that all those who did not belong
to any of the recognized religions were atheists and therefore communists. In
Timor in 1965 a large proportion of the population still adhered to the tradi-
tional animist religion. Many of those who realized the peril they were.in
rushed to join the church, but others were only saved by church officials
answering, when questioned by the army about the names of local 'heathens',
that there were none. Many areas thus went from 80% animist to 100%
Christian overnight. The details of getting people formally into the church
were to be worried about later. However, the result was that tens of thou-
sands of people renewed their church membership or joined the church for
the first time (Cooley 1976:203, 347; Brookes 1977:86).
Conclusion
The PKI was active in West Timor and the surrounding islands from the year
of its inception until its dissolution in 1966. Throughout that period the
party's operations were affected by local conditions. The majority religion in
56
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the Timor region is Christianity, and whether or not its members were also
members of the church seems never to have been an issue for the party. The
church was not equally supportive of co-membership of the PKI. Although
the popularity of the church at times was cynically exploited by some PKI
members to attract interest in their party, one cannot conclude that those PKI
members and leaders in West Timor who claimed to be Christians were not
sincere in their belief. In Timor indigenous animist beliefs and a strong belief
in witchcraft, traditional magic and the supernatural also affected the way
the PKI conducted itself in the region. Dutch sources from as early as 1926
mention communist activists in the region who were also retailers of amulets
and charms, which they sometimes sold to fraudulently enlist people in com-
munist organizations. In 1965 the makdok movement of Balthasar Klau acted
in a similar way. As in the case of the Christians, however, there is no basis
for assuming that all animists were incapable of understanding politics -
many of them were probably conscious supporters of the PKI. Throughout
the period the PKI was involved in more conventional radical political
actions as well. Its members regularly challenged the traditional authority of
the rajas and of the government. In its actions the party scored many suc-
cesses; perhaps the greatest of which was its appeal to a wide variety of peo-
ple in the Timor region and its ability to convince them that the PKI could
respond to their special needs. Muslims, Christians, animists, university lec-
turers and illiterate farmers all looked to the PKI for the fulfilment of their
aspirations and all shared in the tragedy of the party's bloody defeat.
ABBREVIATIONS
ARA Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague.
BTI Barisan Tani Indonesia, Indonesian Farmers' Front.
CPA Communist Party of Australia.
GMIT Gereja Masehi Injili Timor, Timor Evangelical Christian Church.
MPR Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People's Consultative Assembly.
NAA National Archives of Australia.
Nasakom Nasionalisme Agama Komunisme, Nationalism Religion Communism.
Parkindo Partai Kristen Indonesia, Indonesian Protestant Party.
PDI Persatoean Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democratic Union.
PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party.
PKTI Persaudaraan Kaum Tani Indonesia, Brotherhood of Indonesian
Farmers.
SEAC South East Asia Command.
SKBI Serikat Kaoem Boeroeh Indonesia, Indonesian Labour Union.
SOBSI ' Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, All-Indonesia Central
Labour Organization.
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